The concept of media influence has a long history in media and communication studies, and has also had significant influence on public policy. This paper revisits questions of media influence through three short case studies. First, it critically analyses the strongly partisan position of News Corporation's newspapers against the Labor government during the 2013 Australian Federal election to consider whether the potential for media influence equated to the effective use of media power. Second, it discusses the assumption in broadcasting legislation, in both the UK and Australia, that terrestrial broadcasting should be subject to more content regulation than subscription services, and notes the new challenges arising from digital television and over-the-top video streaming services. Finally, it discusses the rise of multi-platform global content aggregators such as Google, Apple, Microsoft and others, and how their rise necessitates changes in ways of thinking about concentration of media ownership, and regulations that may ensue from it.
The commitment to public service broadcasting, and the licencing of commercial broadcasters, arose in a context where it was believed that mass communications media such as radio and television were particularly likely to be able to influence public opinion, and that there was a social responsibility to direct such influence towards the public good. From a historical perspective, John Thompson has drawn attention to the centrality of communications media to the formation of modern societies, through 'the social organization of symbolic power' and the capacity of media as cultural institutions to 'intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms' (Thompson 1995: 17) .
The pioneering media sociology of Jeremy Tunstall focused on questions of media power and influence, whether through media policy, the relationship of media to liberal-democratic societies, media professions and the management of social relations within media institutions, and the changing contours of global media power and influence (Tumber 2005) . In the latter case, Tunstall famous proclaimed in 1978 that The Media Are American, observing that the influence of U.S. production cultures and values in global media was considerably greater than the apparent reach of U.S. media content, only to question that account 30 years later in
The Media Were American (Tunstall 2008) , where he drew attention to the fast-growing influence of the BRICS nations in the global media environment, and the crisis of credibility of U.S. news agencies in the wake of their reporting of the Iraq War from 2003. 2 This paper will consider contemporary questions relating to media influence from three perspectives. First, there is a case study of newspaper reporting of the 2013 Australian Federal election to show how complex it can be to attribute influence to media in terms of political outcomes, and the continuing relevance of intervening variables in such research.
Second, the paper discusses questions that arise in the context of media convergence, and the uncoupling of media content from particular delivery platforms, for differential forms of media regulation that derive from the perceived influence of particular media platforms.
Finally, there is a discussion of the question of who is a 'media company' in this environment, and some new questions that will need to be asked by policy-makers and researchers about media influence.
Media Influence or Media Power?
In this paper, I use the term 'media influence' rather than 'media power'. I observe that the concept of 'media power' is used by Thompson, Tunstall, Hall and others as an alternative to the term 'influence', that is seen as being aligned to liberal-pluralist political theory (Hall 1982) , or to the 'new revisionism' in media and communication studies that sees the active audience as effectively resistant to mass media messages (Curran 1995) . At the same time, the term 'media influence' is preferred as it suggests that the extent to which power exists in relation to media and the social environment remains uncertain, and its effectiveness cannot simply be inferred from its potential existence. For instance, news coverage may influence how voters behave in elections, but cannot determine who wins or loses them. The risk with the term 'media power' is that it simply assumed what it needs to prove i.e. that the media have significant society-wide influences. In other words, to the degree that power exists, it exists in terms of the ability to influence outcomes rather than to determine them. So we have the apparent exercise of media power, and motives to do so, but the evidence of whether it influenced the election results is considerably more mixed. The two-party preferred (2PP) swing to the Coalition was 3.65 per cent on the 2010 result, leading to the Coalition winning 17 seats; while this was a significant swing, it was well within the projections of all opinion polls, and was ultimately a lower swing against Labor than many had been expecting. It is also notable that the largest 2PP swings against Labor were in states such as Victoria 
Over-the-Top Services
One of the features of broadcast media regulation throughout the world is that it tends, overall, to be more regulated than print media. Concepts of fairness, universality, social responsibility and the public interest featuring prominently in broadcasting laws around the world. In some broadcasting systems, these are expressed directly through the Charters of public service broadcasters, and in others they are applied more indirectly through the licencing conditions attached to commercially based and privately owned broadcasters While provision (a) relates specifically to the content of programs, sections (b) and (c) relate directly to the type of service in question, and section (d) implies that terrestrial broadcasting services are more likely to be the subject of inadvertent exposure to content than those associated with subscription services. On the basis of provisions such as these, more 'light touch' regulation of subscription services can be justified on the basis of the services being more specifically 'media of choice' than those which are freely available to all viewers, and hence less subject to provisions concerning decency, protection of children, and impartiality in news and current affairs programs.
Similarly, under the Australian Broadcasting Services Act 1992 a commercial broadcasting service is one that provides programs intended to appeal to the general public, are able to be received by commonly available equipment, are made available free to the general public, and are usually funded by advertising revenue. Under the Australian provisions, it is the payment of a fee for such services rather than the reach of the programs that is the key distinction made, but it is again assumed that cable and satellite services reach fewer viewers than terrestrial broadcasters, and hence require fewer regulations. For example, 'watershed' restrictions on the times of the day/evening when certain types of programs (e.g. those containing strong violence) can be shown apply to terrestrial broadcasters but not to subscription broadcasters.
These distinctions have proven to be broadly workable where the equipment required for access to non-traditional broadcast media content was not widely available, and when the number of channels available through terrestrial broadcasting was relatively limited. 3 The arrival of digital television complicates this picture somewhat, as it enables the terrestrial broadcasters to develop niche channels which, it can be argued, are not intended to provide content that appeals to 'mass' audiences. The larger problem now is that, in an era of nearuniversal access to the Internet, and to global video content services such as YouTube, Vimeo, Dailymotion, Facebook and myriad other video content sharing services, such distinctions are very hard to sustain. Given that such services are not bound to any single territorial jurisdiction, the question of who could regulate content for such services, even if there was a political will to do so, is highly contentions.
In Australia, issues such as these were considered in the National Classification Scheme whether the existence of multiple terrestrial (free-to-air) digital channels points to a need to relax content restrictions on the main broadcasting channels.
In considering this question, some relevant issues are:
 the now quite large audiences such channels attract, accounting for up to 25 per cent of television viewing in Australia;
 the existence of various specialist channels offered by the public broadcasters, including two children's channels offered by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC);
 the growth of catch-up TV viewing through services such as the ABC's iView and the BBC's iPlayer as well as through the Internet;
 the quite different rules that apply to such matters as time-zone restrictions ('watershed hours') for programs broadcast on the digital multichannels as compared to the main channels; and  the availability of parental locking devices on all new televisions sold in Australia.
The Review recommended a gradual relaxation of restrictions applying to the main terrestrial channels in recognition of what are now significantly changing viewer approaches to television in Australia. For example, content specifically aimed at children of different ages on ABC2 and ABC3 would suggest that the rules governing times at which content that is rated other than 'G' (General) should be relaxed. Most importantly it was recommended that any new broadcasting legislation should not contain any mandates on when particular types of programs can be shown on television, so that such guidelines are set through industry codes developed in consultation with the public and through negotiation with the Australian Communication and Media Authority (ACMA). In this way, there is sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in community expectations as well as new technologies while enabling the principles associated with media content classification, such as consumer information and the protection of children, to continue to have relevance and force (ALRC 2012: 192-196 ).
The issues presented by Internet-based video sharing services are far more complex. At some level, national regulators need to acknowledge that much of the work related to management of such content can only be undertaken by the content service providers themselves, and that the national regulators can draw upon the experience that they have with the content which they can classify -typically feature films, some television programs, and some computer games -to provide guidance to those services themselves about how they may operate within particular countries.
The ALRC review referred to this as deeming, whereby content that has been subject to an authorised classification system in another jurisdiction (e.g. computer games classified by the Pan-European Games Initiative or the US-based Entertainment Software Rating Board) would be deemed to have an equivalent classification in Australia unless there were reasons to consider reclassifying the content. Extending this logic, decisions made by global content service providers such as Google, Apple and Microsoft may be deemed to apply in countries such as Australia subject to the national regulator continuing to have powers to determine the bases on which decisions were being made, in negotiation with the provider (Flew 2012) . In more general terms, the ALRC sought to develop a platform-neutral approach to media content regulation, where the focus was on the content itself rather than on its delivery platform (e.g. a feature film is classified, but the same content accessed over the Internet is not), with the content being considered appropriate for classification if it was 'made and distributed on a commercial basis and has a significant Australian audience' (ALRC 2012:
125).
Global Content Aggregators and the New Ownership Landscape
A final changing conception of media influence to be considered concerns the implications of media convergence for how we think about ownership concentration and market power. The most commonly used measure of media ownership in media economics is the concentration ratio, which measures what percentage of a market is controlled by the top four or top eight firms in an industry. As a general rule, media industries tend to be oligopolistic, with the top four firms dominating the market. This in turn raises issues about uses of market power, such as prices being unreasonably high, the maintenance of barriers to entry, collusion among industry participants, and the ability to translate this economic power into the exercise of political power in ways that may be at odds with principles concerning the role of media in democratic societies (Gomery 1989; Doyle 2013 The broader the terms are being used, the more challenging these questions become.
Speaking of the newspaper, radio or television industry is one thing, but does it make sense to aggregate them as the media industries? Indeed, what does it then mean to align these industries with the arts, design, fashion, architecture, computer games etc. and refer to them as the creative industries? Likewise with a market: the UK is often thought of as having a national newspaper market but, as Collins and Cave (2013) note, Scottish newspaper preferences are quite different to those in England, and within England there are strong regional voices, such as The Yorkshire Post. These issues play out more strongly in other countries. In Australia, while there are 12 capital city and national daily newspapers, only four of these have any significant readership outside of one city; the rest sit within clearly delineated regional geographical markets.
Media convergence is blurring these lines even further. In his global study of media concentration, Eli Noam (2009 Noam ( , 2013 has argued that what he calls the 'digital optimists' are partly right to perceive that the Internet has reduced the degree of media concentration found in the 1980s, but that those of a more pessimistic view are right to perceive an increase in media concentration in recent years, driven by the increasingly global scale of media operations. But the big change in these debates, and the one that existing tools to measure media concentration capture poorly, is that a two-tier media system has been evolving, with large integrator firms operating in oligopolistic market structures being at its core, surrounded by a large number of specialist firms that undertake much of the actual content production (Noam 2009, 436-437) .
The second half of the 2010s was a period of crisis for many of the media conglomerates that It is the broader ecosystem in which digital distribution is rendered possible and new forms of user engagement take shape. It is as much about the aesthetic and social experience of second screen media as it is about the intermediaries that deliver content to mobile devices and the gatekeepers regulating our Internet access.
Connected viewing spans a wide spectrum of industrial practices, from multi-platform modes of production and distribution to the reconfigured promotional strategies and measurement techniques increasingly necessary to gauge marketing success in the digital space (Holt and Sanson 2014: 2) .
One way of addressing such conundrums in terms of their policy implications was undertaken by Australia's Convergence Review Committee. Asked to 'review the current policy framework for the production and delivery of media content and communications services …  Has control over the content that is supplied i.e. it is professionally-produced media content;
 Has a large number of Australians who use or access that content;
 Derives significant revenue from supplying that content to Australians.
The Convergence Review took the view that CSEs should continue to be subject to those forms of media regulation that Australians continued to see as being important, including:
public interest tests in relation to changes in ownership and control; classification information about content and access restrictions where appropriate; community expectations concerning fairness, accuracy and transparency in their reporting of news and information; and contributing to the overall level of local content production, in order to contribute to a national culture.
The regulatory radicalism of the CSE proposal failed to get traction in the legislation that subsequently appeared. For the most part, the print, radio, television and Internet industries continue to approach public policy in platform-specific terms, and governments are evaluated on what they may deliver or not deliver to each industry in isolation. It is, however, interesting to note that companies such as Google responded to these recommendations not by outright rejection of regulation, but by instead arguing that they are already significantly contributing to Australian content and culture. In the report titled Culture Boom: How Digital Media are Invigorating Australia (Belza et. al. 2012) , undertaken by the Boston Consulting
Group and commissioned by Google Australia, it was argued that Australian online content creators were already generating a consumer surplus for Australians as well as generating new export opportunities, and that new local content rules for companies such as Google were unnecessary as they were already making a positive contribution to the local media content environment. They were, however, prepared to accept that they are at some level in the media business, even if not in the form of mass broadcast media that dominated the latter part of the 20 th century.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to critically reflect upon the ways in which the concept of 'media influence', which has long been a staple of both media and communications studies and The second case study considered how broadcasting legislation in the United Kingdom and Australia has sought to set differential regulatory requirements for broadcasting and cable services. It was argued that the traditional distinctions, based upon universality of access or whether the service is user-pays, do not hold in an era where over-the-top video streaming services are providing freely available content over universally available devices. The challenge presented by the OTT services is part of the wider uncoupling of media content from specific platforms in an era of media convergence, presenting the challenge of how to devise regulations that relate to media content that can be platform neutral in their application.
Finally, the paper discusses the implications of multi-platform content aggregators with their roots in the ICT and software industries for how we think about key aspects of media policy, such as media ownership and content laws. The definition of 'media' that we have been working with in legislation, with its neat divisions between broadcasting and telecommunications, and its bracketing off of these spheres from convergent communications, is becoming less and less tenable, since it has ever less ability to explain how the world's largest companies in these businesses -familiar names such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook -now operate. Any future discussion of 'media influence' is going to have to go beyond traditional media, and consider the influence of media content aggregators in their various shifting forms.
1 A version of this paper was presented to students and staff at the Department of Sociology, City University, London, on 21 October 2013. My thanks to Petros Iosifidis for organising the event, and to Carolina Matos for chairing the discussion. 2 The term 'BRICS' refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Korea. In general, it draws attention to the rising influence of emerging nations, most of which are outside of the OECD, in the global economy. In terms of media, nations such as South Africa, Indonesia, Lebanon, Egypt, Nigeria, Mexico, and the Gulf states also warrant attention in this regard. 3 The distinction works less well in countries where the percentage of the population who subscribe to cable and satellite services is high. Market penetration rates for Australia (30%) and the United Kingdom (50%) are, for example, considerably lower than the 85-90% penetration rates found in the United States and Canada, and where most consumers experience network and cable television as essentially a part of the same service.
